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Should there be a change in United States Government (USG) foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq? This 
question merits attention in the wake of allegedly conciliatory comments towards the USG made by 
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami and of continued noncompliance by Saddam Hussein with United 
Nations (UN)-mandated sanctions. 
 
Since the Gulf War, the USG has seemed to embrace a dual containment policy--characterized by 
sanctions towards both countries. In Iran's case, the sanctions have been intended to deter terrorism, 
development of weapons of mass destruction, and the attempted derailment of Israeli-Palestinian peace 
efforts. In Iraq's case, the sanctions have been authorized by United Nations mandate and largely entail 
the intent to deprive Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and the means to develop them. 
 
In both cases the policy seems to have failed. Iran has not been deterred, nor has Iraq. In fact, pressure 
is building on the USG to ease up on the sanctions and even end them, not on the intended targets to 
meet USG demands. Where does this pressure come from? From many other countries that continue to 
do business with Iran. From US companies that are forced to forgo pieces of the action. From many 
countries that continue economic and political engagement with Iran--despite pressure from the USG. 
From the cries of US violations and hubris towards sovereignty made by these countries regarding the 
Iran-Libya sanctions Act of 1986. From the epiphenomenal weakening of the relationships between 
these countries and the US. 
 
In the Iraqi case there is also pressure on the USG. From media reports of the sanctions' ill effects on 
children. From money owed by the Iraqi government to other countries. From business agreements 
between Iraq and other countries that are to be activated when the sanctions are removed. From 
ongoing economic "leakage" that renders the sanctions less than 100% effective. From the resulting 
weakening of support for the UN accords among nations that allowed the sanctions to be instituted. In 
fact, Iran has helped Iraq circumvent UN sanctions--even if a few years earlier both countries were 
involved in a bloody war. 
 
Psychologically all this might be predicted from classical balance theories--initially applied to cognitive 
structures of individuals and later to interactions among many configurations including those of 
sociometry and power. By reinforcing negative relationships with Iran and Iraq, the USG is creating a 
triadic configuration that would induce a dynamic towards a positive relationship between Iran and Iraq. 
In other words, they can be brought together by sharing the same enemy--synergistically increasing 
problems for the USG. This might be the case even though employing punishment or omission training 
towards Iran and Iraq might otherwise be expected to decrease the probability of their behaviors 
deemed undesirable by the USG. (Of course, another Issue is that the punishment and omission training 
implemented by the US is perceived as insufficient or even qualitatively different by their targets. 
 
Balance theory would suggest two policy alternatives for the USG. (1) Reinforcing positive relationships 
with both countries regardless of their behaviors might be expected to engage Iran and Iraq in a 
competition for the favors of the USG. This might be a political "hard sell" for the US Executive towards 
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the US Congress. Also, it might just as well expected that Iran and Iraq would continue business as usual 
or exacerbate undesirable behavior as defined by US leaders with even less regard for the USG. (2) 
Instituting a sequence of siding with one country against the other, then--when the former becomes too 
strong--switching allegiances, might increase the probability that Iran and Iraq would more often work 
against each other and attempt to use the USG as an ally. In some ways this might seem similar to USG 
policy towards the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during the Nixon era and towards 
Iran and Iraq during the middle and end of the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. 
 
With caveats for elements of indifference, uncertainty, ideology, and other epistemological assumptions 
concerning the perceptions of political relationships among the political elite, one might conclude that 
policy alternative (2)--an unbalanced balance theory--may right the imbalance of the current "balanced" 
policy. (See Cartwright, D., & Harary F. (1956). Structural balance: A generalization of Heider's theory. 
Psychological Review, 63, 277-293; Moore, M. (1978). An international application of Heider's balance 
theory. European Journal of Social Psychology, 8, 401-405; Price, K.O., Harburg, E., & Newcomb, T.M. 
(1966). Psychological balance in situations of negative interpersonal attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 3, 265-270; Sciolino, E. (December 16, 1997). Clinton hails Iran's conciliatory remarks, 
while listing concerns. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Weir, A.J. (1983). Notes for a 
prehistory of cognitive balance theory. British Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 351-362.) 
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